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Devaluation,the Price Level
and Economic Activity1
Oneof the common arguments against devaluation in India has been that it
would be inflationary. If indeed this were the case, any price advantage that
devaluation might confer in export markets would be blunted and might even
be completely neutralized.
There was price inflation in India, at any rate since 1962—63, and the
pace of price rise indeed quickened in 1966—67. This led some uncritical ob-
servers to attribute this phenomenon to devaluation on a post hoc ergo propter
hoc basis. Hence it is necessary to examine the issue of the endogenous impact
of the devaluation package on the price level carefully and in depth. Indeed,
as we show presently, meaningful analysis of this question must bring in the
effect of the abnormal drought in two consecutive years on cereal and raw
material prices and through these on the prices of other commodities; and
when we have done this, and considered other pertinent factors, the judgment
reached on the issue of the impact of the devaluation package changes dras-
tically.
First, let us examine the few pertinent facts that we have collected in
Table 8—1. The major features there are: (1) the impact of the two consecu-
tive droughts as reflected in the fall in real income originating in agriculture in
965—66 and 1966—67 as compared with 1964—65; (2) the continued rise in
the wholesale price index, a process that began in a sustained fashion from
(3) a rise in the relative price of food articles as compared with the
prices of manufactures in general and prices of equipment in particular; (4) a
shift away from investment toward consumption in public sector expenditure;
(5) a drastic fall in non-food aid disbursements net of debt service payments
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TABLE 8-1
Key Economic Indicators, 1964—68
1964—651965—661966—67 1967—68
1. Index number of wholesale prices
(1961—62 =100)
All commodities 122.3 131.6 149.9 167.3
Cereals 112.0 135.2 146.2 173.7
Food articles 135.4 144.6 171.1 207.8
Rawmaterials 115.9 132.8 158.4 156.4
Manufactures 109.0 118.1 127.5 131.1
Cotton manufactures 109.6 114.4 121.6 128.9
Equipment 108.3 111.8 117.7 126.5
2. Public sectora
(Rs. billions)
Tax receipts of central, state
and local government 26.94 30.48 36.38
Subsidies 1.47 1.91 4.12 3.55
Public consumption 20.05 22.96 24.96 27.80
Gross public investment 20.10 21.22 21.86 20.01
Net defense expenditure 8.06 8.85 9.09 9.68
Overall deficit 1.52 3.31 2.26 2.57
3. Private sector
(Rs. billions)
Consumption 178.49 180.02 213.18 256.85
Gross investment 17.55 21.60 24.01 28.01
4. Foreign tradeb
(U.S. $millions)
Exports 1,714 1,692 1,542 1,598
Imports 2,833 2,958 2,771 2,677
Of which: food 592 •676 868 691
maintenance 1,684 1,726 1,393 1,508
complete machinery 435 438 363 289
iron and steel 219 205 131 142
non-ferrous metals 123 144 114 119
5. External assistance
(U.S. $millions)
Gross aid disbursements 1,519 1,623 1,494 1,575
Of which: food aid 446 476 538 447
project aid 701 684 497 380
non-project aid 352 421 424 672
non-food PL 480 aid 20 42 35 76
Debt service 255 315 365 444





Atcurrentprices 200.61 206.21 239.03 283.74
At 1960—61 prices 159.17 150.21 152.43 166.60
Of which: agriculture 72.24 61.45 60.94 71.93
others 86.93 88.76 91.49 94.67
7.Changes in money supply with the
public (Rs. billions) 3.35 4.43 3.80 4.51
Of which (a) Reserve Bank net
credit to government1.36 3.98 1.89 1.66
(b) CommercialBank
holdings of
government securities 1.41 1.14 0.83 0.96
(c) Total net bank credit
to government
[=(a)+(b)] 2.77 5.12 2.73 2.61
8.Some percentages
i) Gross public investment
Gross public outlay 50.0 48.0 46.7 41.9
ii) Tax receipts
National income 13.4 14.8 14.3 12.8
iii) Gross domestic savings
Gross domestic product 14.2 15.6 13.5 12.2
SOURCES: EconomicSurvey,1967—68 and 1968—69, Government of India, Ministry
of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, New Delhi.
Estimates of National Product,1960—61 to 1969—70 andIndexNumbers of Whole-
sale Prices in india, annualnumbers from 1962 to 1970, Government of India, New
Delhi.
a.The total expenditure exceeds tax receipts plus the overall deficit because of
non-tax revenue and capital receipts consisting of domestic and external borrowing.
b. Maintenance imports consist of intermediates, raw materials, spares and com-
ponentsof machinery. Therefore, they also include iron and steel as well as non-ferrous
metals.
c.Provisional estimates, except for 1964—65.
after 1965—66; (6) a fall in exports as well as imports, particularly imports of
complete machinery; and (7) a fall in the ratio of tax receipts to national
income and gross domestic savings to gross domestic product. In analyzing this
picture we shall attempt, to the extent possible, to separate the effect of the
drought.114 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
EFFECT OF THE DROUGHT ON PRICES
It appears that the prices of manufactures are determined by cost considera-
tions since they are very closely related to the prices of industrial raw materials.
However, the element of the cost-push mechanism that operates through the
presumed relationship between wagesandprices of food articles appears to be
weak. This is seen from the following relationship:
=56.6215+ + — (8—1)
(24.2922) (0.6332)(10.2962)(—4.5728)
R2 =0.9778;D.W. =1.15;period 195 1—1952 to 1960—6 1 and 1962—63
to 1970—7 1,
where is the index of wholesale prices of manufactures with base
1950—51 up to 1960—61 and with base 1961—62 beyond 1960—61, ftis
the index of wholesale prices of food articles with an identical shift in base,
is the index of wholesale prices of raw materials again with shift of base be-
yond 1960—61, andis a dummyvariable which takes the value zero up to
and including 1960—6 1 and the value 1 beyond (the dummy having been intro-
duced to reflect the change in the base of the price index in 1961—62). Only
the coefficients ofand the dummy are significant. Replacing byin the
above relationship yielded the same results—namely, that only the coefficients
of prices of raw materials and the dummy were significant. This is not surpris-
ing, since the prices of raw materials are closely correlated with those of food
articles, a relationship which is the consequence of the fact that a large propor-
tion of the raw materials is agriculture-based and factors that affect agricul-
ture in general affect both the availability of raw materials and food articles
similarly. This relationship is as follows:'
R= 11.9317 + 0.1789f,_1— (8—2)
(1.22)(2.56)(0.75) (—0.97)
=0.9097;D.W. =1.57;period 1952—53 to 1960—61, 1962—63 to
1970—7 1.
Thus an explanation of the behavior of prices in the Indian economy has
to be sought in an explanation of the behavior of the prices of food articles.
Since foodgrains in general, and cereals in particular, form an overwhelming
proportion of the consumer budget, cereals have a large weight in the index
of prices of food articles.
We now turn to a simple simultaneous equation model to explain the
prices of cereals. In a poor peasant economy such as India's, the bulk of the
output of food crops gets consumed on the farm and never gets to the market.DEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 115
But for explaining the behavior of food prices, the marketed portion of the
output is relevant. Unfortunately, there is no time series available on marketed
surplus. Some data on market arrivals in selected markets are available but the
number of markets on which these are based have varied over time. However,
Pranab and Kalpana Bardhan have constructed a time series of marketed
surplus of cereals based on the National Sample Survey data on consumption
expenditure.2 Their series runs only up to 1964—65. We have extended it to
later years by assuming that the marketed surplus changed in the same propor-
tion as market arrivals of major cereals (fortunately, the number of markets
on which the arrivals data are based has remained the same since 1964—65).
The behavioral model we have estimated is the following:
Yt =a0+ + a2Pt + Ut (8—3)
(8—4)
where the endogenous variables are yt,themarketed surplus of cereals, and
the wholesale price of cereals relative to that of cotton manufactures.3 The exo-
genous variables are YAI, the real income originating in agriculture; YNAt, the
real non-agricultural income (both incomes being measured in units of 1 bil-
lion rupees); and Zt,theimports of foodgrains (in million tons). In the first
equation, which is the supply equation, we postulate that marketed surplus is
related to real agricultural income and the relative price of cereals. In the
second equation—the demand equation—demand is related to relative prices




=0.6154;period 1952—53 to 1969—70.
The two-stage least squares estimates of the two structural equations are:
Yt =5.6380+ + 0.1828YAt, = 0.2939 (8—6)
(1.40)(0.10) (2.40) D.W. =1.91
Yt+Zt =16.8539—12.4023Pt+0.2341YNAt,R2= 0.8383(8—7)
(7.01)(—2.49) (5.84) D.W. =2.30
In the supply equation, the relative price variable is not significant while
the income variable is. In the demand equation, both the relative price and
income variables are significant.
The reduced form equation forcan be used to assess the effect of the
drought on the prices of cereals. This we do as follows. First, we get an esti-
mate of the expected value ofunder the assumption that real income
originating in agriculture maintained the level attained in 1964—65 both in116 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
TABLE 8-2
Index of Cereal Prices, 1964—67
With 1964—65
With Actual Values of With Trend
Observed Valuesof for 1965—66 Valuesof
Year Value and 1966—67
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1964—65 139.3 133.6 133.6 135.3
1965—66 148.0 153.4 133.1 131.3
1966—67 175.8 175.0 152.3 146.3
SOURCE: Equations 8—5, 8—6 and 8—7.
1966—67 and 1967—68 as contrasted with the fall of 14.9 and 15.7 percent,
respectively, in these two years. We convert these expected values ofto an
expected value of index of cereal prices by multiplying by the observed value
of the index of prices of cotton manufactures in these two years. (As men-
tioned earlier, the prices of manufactures in general and prices of cotton manu-
factures in particular are mainly influenced by the prices of raw materials. In
the case of cotton manufactures, the basic raw material is cotton and raw
cotton prices did rise, particularly in 1966—67, in response to lower output due
to the drought. Thus, by using the observed prices of cotton manufactures in
obtaining the expected values of index of cereal prices, we areunderstatingthe
effect of drought somewhat since we are not removing the influence of drought
on the prices of cotton manufactures.)4 The picture that emerges is highlighted
in Table 8—2.
Thus the expected prices of cereals should have been lower by approxi-
mately 10 percent in 1965—66 and 1966—67 had the drought not lowered real
agricultural income (and hence the marketed surplus) in these years as com-
pared with 1964—65. The above analysis suggests, therefore, that in the be-
havior of prices immediately after devaluation the effect of the two consecutive
droughts of unprecedented proportion was the dominant one.5
ROLE OF MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY
Not merely was a significant part of the post-devaluation price rise due to the
exogenous fact of the droughts; in addition, the government's monetary and
fiscal policies appear to have been designed to decelerate rather than accelerate
the trend rise in expenditures and in money supply (which, in turn, largely
reflects government spending as in many other LDCs). As will be evident from
our discussion below, India was to experience an industrial recession togetherDEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 117
with a wage-goods price inflation brought about by the drought. And monetary
and fiscal policy decisions were largely motivated by the fear of adding to the
price rises resulting from the drought, rather thanconsiderations of the
1966 trade-and-exchange-rate policy package. In fact, the contractionary fiscal
and monetary policy, so motivated, contributed significantly to the onset of the
industrial recession, along with the shift in the corn position (as distinct from
the level) of government outlays away from investment to current expenditures
(which resulted in reduced demand for the output of the capital goods sector).
1. The overall budgetary deficit of the Central and State governments fell
from a level of Rs. 3.34 billion in the pre-devaluation year of 1965—66 to Rs.
2.26 billion and Rs. 2.57billion,respectively, in the subsequent two years
(Table 8—1). Though these are ex-post magnitudes, the budgeted or ex-ante
deficits for 1966—67 and 1967—68 were even lower at :Rs. .52 billion and Rs.
.89 billion, respectively.
2. Furthermore, the money supply with the public increased by Rs. 3.8
billion and Rs. 4.5 1 billion, respectively, in the two post-devaluation years as
compared with a rise of Rs. 4.44 billion in the pre-devaluation year of
1965—66. Further, a major element in the expansion of money in India as in
other less developed countries—namely, increase in net bank credit to govern-
ment—fell from Rs. 5.12 billion in 1965—66 to Rs. 2.73 billion and Rs. 2.61
billion in the subsequent two years.
It is, of course, of interest to note also that the effect of the fiscal and
monetary contraction was accentuated by an accompanying shift in the com-
position of government outlays. As is clear from Table 8—1, the pattern of
outlays shifted in favor of current expenditure and aniong the significant re-
ductions in government outlays was a cutback on railway expansion. This
accentuated the deflationary impact of the fiscal policy because, on balance, it
must have implied that expenditure was shifting from items such as capital
goods where output fell in consequence (as we shall discuss in greater depth)
to items such as food where output could not increase owing to short-run pro-
duction constraints. Thus, investment in the industrial sector decelerated on an
accelerator-type mechanism whereas there was no offsetting impact through
incremental outlays in agriculture. On balance, therefore, the effect of the shift
in the composition of outlays must have been to accentuate the deflationary
effect of decelerating government total outlays on production and investment.
Both the deceleration in total outlays and the compositional shift which
we have just discussed were to be traced to two causes: one exogenous and
major, and the other endogenous and only minor and possibly contributory, to
the June 1966 policy package. The exogenous and pri:ncipal factor was again
the agricultural drought. It is clear from policy pronouncements (e.g., in the
annual Economic Survey following the devaluation) that the government was
afraid that any sustenance of the trend expansion in outlays would accentuate
the rise in food prices that followed from the drought; and the same fears118 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
clearly dictated that, while current outlays could not be reduced (e.g., wages
in the bureaucracy could not be controlled in a situation of risen prices without
serious unrest), capital outlays could be axed without serious difficulty.
But the deflationary policy may, to a very small degree, have been in-
spired by the devaluation decision itself. There is some (though not consider-
able) evidence, in the writings of both the relevant Ministries and of outside
economists, that the devaluation was thought to be necessarily inflationary.
This belief, of course, stems from thinking in terms of the standard model of
devaluation analysis, beginning with Alexander, Tinbergen and Meade's work,
that devaluation is likely to switch expenditure from foreign to domestic goods
and that, for this policy to lead to improvement in the balance of payments, an
offsetting deflationary policy is necessary. This view ignores one critical ele-
ment in LDC devaluations—namely, that the inflow of aid implies that the
immediate effect of the devaluation is likely to be significantly deflationary
because imports often exceed exports by a factor of even two. Also, the fact
that the net, as distinct from the gross, devaluation was not quite as great as
was commonly believed, as our estimates in Chapter 6 have shown, implied
that any need for such a compensatory deflationary policy was correspondingly
less, ceteris paribus.
On balance, we conclude that government decisions with respect to mone-
tary and fiscal policy were quite naturally motivated by fear of inflation,
prompted almost exclusively by the effects of the (exogenous factor of the)
drought.
RECESSION AND INFLATION
We thus had the curious combination of a recessionary situation, with produc-
tion and investment at reduced levels in the two years following the June 1966
change, along with an accelerated price increase. The latter was, as we have
argued, very much the result of the droughts. And the former, as we have
briefly indicated above and argue more substantively below, was equally so.
Indeed, if anything, we argue presently that the June 1966 policy package
mildly improved the level of industrial production and, in the same fashion,
may have had a favorable (even if negligible) impact on investment. To this
analysis we now turn.
EFFECT ON PRODUCTION
The (short-run) effect of the devaluation-cum-liberalization package of June
1966 on overall production can be analyzed by distinguishing four areas of
activity.DEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 119
TABLE 8-3
Index of Production (1949—50 =100):
Actual and Estimated Trend Values
for 1965—66 and 1966—67
1965—66 1966—67 .
Trend Actual ShortfallTrend Actual Shortfall
Crop Value Value (percent)Value Value(percent)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Foodgrains 153.0 120.9 21.0 157.6 123.3 21.4
Cotton 230.4 183.0 20.6 240.9 191.1 20.7
Jute 183.6 135.5 26.2 190.0 162.4 14.5
Oilseeds 157.7 125.4 20.5 163.0 125.7 22.9
SOURCES: Area, Production and Yield of Principal Crops in india, 1949—50 to
1967—68 and Indian Agriculture in Brief, 11th ed., 1971, Government of India, Ministry
of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Economics and Statistics, New Delhi.
Effect on Agricultural Output.
The behavior of agricultural production in the period immediately fol-
lowing the devaluation in June 1966 must be regarded as exogenous to the de-
valuation-cum-liberalization package. Indeed, the second consecutive drought
in 1966—67 dominated agricultural performance as well as the performance of
other sectors closely related to agriculture. The two droughts in the years
1965—66 and 1966—67 were no ordinary droughts, as the foregoing compari-
son (Table 8—3) of expected production (on the basis of observed exponential
trends during the period 1949—50 to 1964—65) and actual values shows.
These shortfalls, except in the case of jute in 1966—67, were statistically sig-
nificant.
Effect on Agriculture-Based Industrial Outputs.
The index (with 1960 as base) of output of agro-based industries in the
organized sector fell from a peak of 121.2 in 1965 successively to 120.0 and
114.7 in 1966 and 1967 and recovered to 118.3 in 1968. The impact of the
drought on two of the major agro-based industries—namely, cotton textiles
and jute textiles—can be estimated from the following two regressions:
Cotton textiles:
QTt =3289.7946+ — ± (8—8)
(11.22)(1.79) (—0.79) (8.01)
R2= 0.93Period 1952—53 to 1969—70
D.W. =2.05120 LIBERALIZATION EPISODE
Jute textiles:
604.7262+ + — (8—9)
(2.71)(1.68) (2.33) (—0.59)
=0.41Period 1952—53 to 1969—70
D.W. =1.07
where QTt: Output of cotton textiles (mill and decentralized sectors),
million meters
Real national income (1960—61 prices), Rs. billion
Index of output of raw cotton (1949—50 =100)
Mci: Imports of raw cotton, thousand tons
Qjj:Outputof jute textiles, thousand tons
Index of output of raw jute (1949—50 =100)
Imports of raw jute, thousand tons
The domestic raw material availability variables have the expected sign
and are statistically significant (at 10 percent level or less) in both regres-
sions.° One can conclude from these regressions that, ceteris paribus, had the
outputs of raw cotton and raw jute been at their trend values in 1965—66 and
1966—67, the expected output would have been higher by 3.0 and 3.1 percent
in the case of cotton textiles and by 6.4 and 12.3 percent in the case of jute
textiles in the two years. In addition to this downward pressure on the output
of these two industries on the supply side, there was a downward pressure on
the demand side, particularly in the case of cotton textiles because of the
drought-induced fall in per capita income (at 1960—61 prices) by 7.6 and 9.2
percent, respectively, in 1965—66 and 1966—67 as compared with 1964—65.
Had there been no fall in income compared with 1964—65, the output of cotton
textiles would have been higher by 2.7 and 2.0 percent, respectively, in 1965—
66 and 1966—67, respectively. Thus the effect of the drought was to reduce the
expected output of cotton textiles by at least 5.7 and 5.1 percent in these two
years. We should further note that the effect of the drought on the output of
jute textiles was reflected significantly in the export performance of this major
traditional item.7
I
Effecton the Output of "Import-Intensive" Industries,
Other than Capital Goods.
These industries include mainly chemical-based industries, some metal-
based industries, and art silk manufactures. Production in all these industries
should have, in principle, profited from the 1966 policy package, both because
of the liberalized maintenance imports as promised in the package and becauseDEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 121
export subsidization was resumed soon after 1966. However, it turned out that
maintenance imports (other than metals, components and parts of machinery)
fell from a level Rs. 3,699 million (pre-devaluation) in 1965—66 to Rs. 3,488
million in 1966—67 and rose to Rs. 4,052 million and Rs. 4,189 million in
1967—68 and 1968-69, respectively. Further, there was a downward pressure
on the domestic demand side since real income did not attain the levels
reached in 1964—65 until 1967—68. Thus the following picture emerges;
TABLE 8-4
Percentage Change from Preceding Year
in Production in Selected Import-Intensive Industries, 1965—66 to 1969—70
(including capital goods)
Weighta1965—661966—671967--681968—691969—70
1.Metal-basedofwhich:16.55+22.11 —10.58 —2.82 +5.71 +5.78
i.electrical machinery3.05+ 17.30+ 10.10+8.10+14.00+16.20
ii.non-electrical
machinery 3.38+46.50 —7.90+2.80 +9.10 +6.90
iii. others 10.12+15.41 —17.71 —7.99 +2.08 +2.27
2.Chemical-based 8.94 +5.57+11.41 +5.:33+14.22+10.31
3.Art silk fabrics 0.08 n.a. —1.8 +6.4 +10.2 —14.6
SOURCE: Government of India, Department of Statistics, Central Statistical Organization,
New Delhi.
a. In industrial production index.
Table 8—4 shows that the chemical-based industries, constituting a weight
of 8.94 (out of a total of 100 in the industrial production index) managed to
experience an increase of 11.41 percent in production in the year following
the devaluation. This strongly suggests that the improved imported-input
supply position and export incentive resumption since June 1966 helped bring
about this outcome.8 The output of metal-based industries(other than
machinery), on the other hand, fell by 17.71 percent and the liberalization
package does not seem to have helped this group. This result, however, may
well be explained by an "over-expansion" during 1965-•66 at 15.41 percent
arid by the fact (to be discussed in the next section) that the near decline in
the output of the capital goods industries may well have had an indirect impact
on the production performance of this group. The performance of art silk
fabrics, whose weight in the industrial production index is less than 1 percent,
also was one of absolute decline during 1966. The downward shift in real
income caused by the drought and the diminished export incentives of the
1966 policy package must have offset improvements in the supply position
that resulted from import liberalization for inputs.122 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
On balance, therefore, we may conclude that the effect of the June 1966
policy package itself on production was favorable for chemicals and for metal-
based industries other than machinery and perhaps mildly adverse for (the
relatively insignificant) art silk fabrics, but that an improvement in produc-
tion performance was registered only for chemicals and was offset by exog-
enous factors for the metal-based industries other than machinery.
Effect on the OutputofCapital Goods (i.e., Machinery) Industries.
The capital goods industries, essentially a subgroup of the engineering
industries group, were also part of the import-intensive industry group we
have just analyzed, and therefore subject to the same influences. But the
favorable effect on their production was heavily swamped by the fact of de-
celerating real investment which (as we have argued earlier) was again a
factor virtually exogenous to the June 1966 policy package. This is seen
readily by noting that Qit, the index of capital goods production, has a strong
and expected relationship withgross real investment, and with imports
of complete machinery:
= —141.5980+ —0.0592M1, (8—10)
(—4.03)(10.94)(—2.79)
k2= 0.91;D.W. =2.20
for the period 1960—61 to 1970—71, where Q't =indexofproduction of capi-
tal goods (1960—61 =100);=grossreal investment, in Rs. 10 million at
1960--61 prices; and =importsof capital goods in million U.S. dollars.
If we use gross fixed real investment rather than gross real investment (in-
clusive of inventory changes), rewriting the variable aswe get:
Qit =—81.6576+ — (8—11)
(—3.17)(12.96) (—2.70)
=0.9392;D.W. =2.89
and it is evident that both regressions, (8—10) and (8—11), lead to similar
conclusions. Thus it is clear that had gross investment been maintained at
the value reached in 1965—66 rather than been allowed to drop by over 10
percent from that level during 1966—67 and 1967—68, the expected value
of the index of capital goods production should have been significantly higher
in these two years. In fact, we have calculated it, using both the above re-
gressions (8—10) and (8—11), and have tabulated the results in Table 8—5.
We see there that, if the investment levels had been maintained during 1966—
67 and 1967—68 at the 1965—66 level, we should have had substantially im-DEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 123
TABLE 8-5
Capital Goods Production Index under
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as follows:
Gross Real Fixed Investment




proved production of capital goods in the order of an average of over 25
and 18 percent increment in the capital goods production index, respectively.9
While, therefore, the output of the capital goods industries registered a
decline induced by factors exogenous to the June 1966 policy changes, these
policy changes themselves must have exercised a favorable impact on pro-
duction. It will be recalled that the parity change and the resumption of ex-
port incentives as well as the easing of imported supplies of inputs very likely
had an impact on the export of engineering goods, of which capital goods
are a part.
EFFECT ON INVESTMENT
While, therefore, the effect of the June 1966 policy package (relating, of
course, to trade and payments policies as distinct from the government's ex-
penditure policy, consistent with our definitions in Chapter 5) on production










(8—10) 1966—67 205.09 250.86 22.36













appears to have been mildly favorable, though not anywhere near enough to
offset the adverse effect of the drought, the effect on investment behavior
is far more difficult to disentangle. This is because of two major difficulties:
(1) the data on investment are very tenuous, and are not available by inter-
industrial sectoral breakdown; and (2) the overall estimates of real invest-
ment, both total and as a percentage of national as well as industrial income,
show a decline from pre-1966 levels right through to 1969—70, suggesting
that there might be underestimation of investment and/or a trend decline
which has probably nothing to do with the 1966 policy package as such. We
begin by examining the probable causes of this decline in total, as well as in
industrial, investment.
1. The decline in government capital outlays, reflecting both the de-
celeration in government total outlays and the shift away from capital ex-
penditures, led (as we have seen) to a decline in the output of capital goods
industries; itis likely also to have led to a decline in the investments in
these industries. But this mechanism was triggered by the exogenous factor
of the droughts and cannpt be charged to the June 1966 policy package.
2. Another factor discussed in India to explain the decline in total and
industrial investment, has been the so-called "Eastern Region" problem. It
appears to be clear from the data on private, organized sector investment
that the relatively anarchic character of West Bengal's politics (where there
was, for a long time, neither a stable left-wing nor a stable alternative govern-
ment) has led to a decline in private sector investments without an offsetting
increase in government investments. This problem, arising from "anarchy in
one state" (and one which could arise also if there was a stable "socialism
in one state") is admittedly an important issue; but it is doubtful whether
it can explain a significant decline in total investments, for many investments
could have gone to other states, if not profitable in the Eastern region.
3. Another explanation could be that total investment did not decline
quite as much in non-industrial activities as is indicated by the present esti-
mates. Rather, it may represent underestimation of rural construction plus
rural investments by farmers on their own farms. There are reasons to be-
lieve that the methods by which the Central Statistical Organization constructs
its investment index would lead it to underestimate these two types of in-
vestment which apparently have, according to other indications, been the
principal types of investments in rural areas, especially in light of the in-
vestment opportunities arising from the Green Revolution since 1964—65.
4. It is also conceivable, though not probable, that an increasing part
of the rural incomes has gone into gold hoarding, implying acceleration in
gold smuggling. The differential between the external and internal gold prices
has not widened particularly. On the other hand, it is possible that this has
been the result of increased diversion of remittances and funds from faked
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5.Animportant contributory role appears to have been played by the
effect of import liberalization in the period immediately following devaluation.
As we note later at some length in Chapter 13, an ilnportant consequence
of the import licensing mechanism was the creation of an incentive to add
capacity in the face of under-utilized capacity in an industry. This was be-
cause the only way to get more imports of inputs (legally) was to add to
(licensed) capacity. This incentive was largely eliminated as imports of raw
materials were increased for many industries with the policy of import liberal-
ization after the June 1966 devaluation and remained so for over two years
before tightening began and de jure import liberalization became overlaid
by de facto import deliberalization. Hence it was to be expected that plans
to add to capacity (i.e., to invest) would receive a setback during this period.
6. The effect of the increased availability of imported raw materials
and intermediates is likely to have been to depress the. inducement to invest
in some industries in yet another way. Increased production from under-
utilized capacity, now feasible, could well lead to reduced prices, increased
competition and lower profits. Jean Baneth has pointed out an extreme illus-
tration in the case of the copper wire industry. All firms in it had been
operating well below desired capacity utilization levels, but all of them were
quite profitable. The devaluation, along with a coincidental sharp rise in
world copper prices, more than doubled the cost of their main input. The
firms, which had initially been happy to find that they could get as much cop-
per as they wished, soon found that, given the existing vast under-utilization
of capacity, a major over-supply situation developed 'which prevented these
firms from substantially raising copper wire prices and greatly depressed their
profit margins. The result was that some firms folded up (and others were
pushed into exporting, a favorable effect which we shall note in Chapter 9
and the Appendix thereto). The net effect was clearly to depress the in-
centive to invest in this and other industries in a similar situation.
7. We may finally note here an additional factor which, while not par-
ticularly significant in the years immediately following the June 1966 policy
package, possibly explains the continuing slack in industrial investment in
the private sector beyond 1968—69. This factor relates to the industrial licens-
ing policy of the government. With perfectly good intentions, the government
loosened up the industrial licensing system, as we have discussed earlier, for
a number of industries around June 1966. However, there were two major
qualifications to this change, one of which appears to have affected the ex-
pansion of industrial investment in the country in the post-1966 period. (1)
Industrial de-licensing was partly negated by the continuation of import
licensing; thus the import licensing authorities became, de facto, industrial
licensing authorities through their allocation of the imports necessary to
production. (2) At the same time, the government, feeling that increasing
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be checked, was to combine these moves toward industrial de-licensing with
greater restriction on the ability of the Large Houses to invest since 1968—69.
These firms, which had provided earlier the major thrust of private investment
(thus naturally attracting the criticisms that led to the restrictions just men-
tioned), were to be restricted to the so-called "core sector" of heavy and
complex industries and to investment in the backward areas. At the same
time, the establishment of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commis-
sion in 1969 provided a further check on their expansion. Thus, the net re-
suit appears to have been to inhibit the investment by the Large Industrial
Houses either by preventing it or by confining it to less lucrative areas such
as heavy industry (where, as we have discussed, profitability was declining
due to a shift of government outlays toward current expenditures) and back-
ward regions. The nationalization of the principal banks in 1969, and the
active pursuit of policy since then to encourage smaller business, should have
compensated for this inhibition of Large House investments; clearly, however,
it di4 not. It appears that the absolutely desirable policy of attempting to curb
the social effects of Large Industrial House control of economic power was
wrongly premised on restricting their investments when they alone seemed
to have the necessary organization and skill to carry through investment on a
sufficiently large scale. Instead the government would have been better advised
to permit their investment programs, treating their investing ability as a
national asset at the present time, and curbing the adverse social effects of
their expansion by instruments such as a capital levy, stiffer wealth and in-
heritance taxes, the appointment of public interest directors to their boards,
by the steady build-up of institutions to promote truly small-scale entrepre-
neurship, and by strengthening of the ability of the public sector to invest,
save and run efficiently as definite objectives of a socio-economic policy.10
8. The decline in government savings and hence investment, in itself,
Constitutes a major part of the estimated decline in post-1966 savings, in
addition to the seven possible reasons discussed above for decline in the
private investment figures. This phenomenon seems to be attributable to the
decline in foreign aid inflow, as well as to the inability to decrease the growth
in defense and current outlays and the continuing failure of the public sector
enterprises to generate profits."
In short, there are several factors, none of them connected with the June
1966 policy package, which appear to have accounted for the stagnation in
investment since 1966—67; and the role of the 1966 reforms in this unfortunate
development in the economy appears to be almost nil. If anything, we might
again argue that the net expansion in the post-1966 exports of the new manu-
fàctures, which our analysis picks up in Chapter 9, and which can be attributed
in large part to the policy changes which were initiated (inclusive of the new
export subsidies discussed in Chapter 7), may. have encouraged some invest-DEVALUATION, THE PRICE LEVEL AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 127
ment in these industries. However, we have no evidence on investments by
industry breakdown to check this hypothesis.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
It would appear, therefore, that the basic developments in the price level,
production and investment that dominated the economic scene in the two
years following the June 1966 liberalization package (and indeed over the
four years since the devaluation, in investment), were the product of factors
that were substantially exogenous to the policy changes. In the main, the price
rises were caused by the drought; the recession in production was also induced
by the drought (in the sense we have discussed) and was not, as has some-
times been the case with LDC devaluations, the result of a concomitant
"stabilization" policy aimed at an excessive deflation; and the investment de-
cline was largely the result of complex factors interacting on the Indian eco-
nomic scene.
NOTES
1. This chapter and the next were completed in December 1971 with the data then
available. This is particularly relevant to our discussion of investment behavior and our
statistical analysis of it. The regression results presented as part of our analysis are based
on data obtained from the following branches of the Government of India, New Delhi:
Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy, 1950—51 to 1966—67, 1950—51 to
1968—69, 1950—5 1 to 1970, Department of Statistics.
Econo,nic Survey, annual issues,1963—64 and1972—.73,Ministry of Finance,
Department of Economic Affairs.
Estimatesof National Product,1948—49 to1962—63, Department of Statistics,
Central Statistical Organization.
Index Number of Wholesale Prices, various issues, Office of the Economics Adviser.
2. P. K. and K. Bardhan, "Price Response of Marketed Surplus of Foodgrains,"
Oxford Econo,nic Papers, N. S. 23, no. 2 (July 1971).
3. In 'defining the relative pricethe price of cotton manufactures was used be-
cause cotton manufactures are a major consumer item and their price is highly correlated
with the price index of manufactures in general.
4. The reason for not incorporating the effect of drought on prices of cotton textile
manufactures through its effect on raw cotton prices is onl.y that, for doing it satisfactorily,
we need a more elaborate simultaneous equation model. In such a model raw-cotton
prices will influence cotton manufacture prices and the latter will enter non-linearly in
the relative price P. used by us since it is the denominator of
S. We may emphasize the fact that in evaluating the effect of drought, the relevant
comparison is between column (3) and either of columns (4) and (5). Take the com-
parison of columns (3) and (4). From column (3) we see that, given the actual values of
real agricultural and non-agricultural incomes as well as imports of foodgrains, the results128 LIBERALIZATIONEPISODE
derived from our model imply an increase in cereal prices in 1965—66 over 1964—65 and a
more substantial increase in 1966—67 over 1965—66. Had there been no drought (in the
sense that agricultural incomes in 1965—66 and 1966—67 were at their 1964—65 values),
column (4) based on our model suggests very little price change in 1965—66 and an
increase in 1966—67 over 1965—66 of the same order in percentage terms as in column
(3). The price stability in 1965—66 and the substantial rise in 1966—67 in column (4) are
due to the fact that while the urban demand for foodgrains increased because of the
increase in real non-agricultural income YNA, in both years compared to 1964—65 (more
so in 1966—67 because of a larger increase in YNAI), the imports of foodgrains which
increased by 2 million tons in 1965—66 as compared with the previous year, fell by 1.50
million tons in 1966—67. Note also that column (5) shows the impact of the drought to
be larger than that shown by column (4). The reason is of course the fact that the trend
values of real agricultural income YAS in 1965—66 and 1966—67 were higher than the
actual value of YAt in 1964—65 (which was itself higher than the trend value for that
year). The fall in cereal prices in 1965—66 as compared to 1964—65 in column (5) is due
to larger imports of foodgrains in 1965—66 (mentioned earlier).
6. The coefficients of the import variables and have the wrong signs in
regressions (8—8) and (8—9) but are statistically insignificant and hence can be ignored.
7. The reader should refer, in this instance, to our discussion of jute exports in the
next chapter.
8. The favorable impact of the liberalization package on exports of chemicals is
discussed at length in Chapter 9.
9. It may be pertinent also to note here that if, instead of using the capital goods
production index, we use as our dependent variable the index of capital goods plus
consumer durables, the broad results mentioned above for capital goods alone are still
valid. However, we consider it more economically meaningful to consider capital goods
alone.
10. For further discussion of these policy changes, see J. Bhagwati, India in the
international Economy: A Policy Framework for a Progressive Society, Lal Bahadur
Shastri Memorial Lectures, 1973 (Hyderabad: Osmania University Press, 1973).
11. The decline in foreign aid seems, at least for maintenance imports, to have been
partly a reflection of the internal recession itself. As we have noted, it was expected that
external assistance, particularly non-project assistance, would be stepped up substantially
after devaluation. Instead, there was a steep fall in disbursement of project assistance
from $684 million in 1965—66 to $497 million in 1966—67 and to $380 million in 1967—68.
Disbursement of non-project assistance was on the order of $421 million, $424 million
and $672 million, respectively, in the three years. At the same time, project and non-
project aid, taken together, fell in the year after devaluation (see Table 8—1) and re-
covered, though not to the level attained in the pre-devaluation year of 1965—66, in
1967—68.